India's Sikhs: Problems and Prospects

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On October 31, 1984 the world was shocked as the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated by a Sikh gunman. The Western image of India's ideal of Gandhi and non-violence was shattered as fierce Hindu-Sikh riots broke out in the capital city of Delhi and other parts of India.

Calm was not to come. On June 23 of the following year, India Airlines Flight 182 vanished from the skies as an explosion killed its cargo of 329 people. *Time Magazine* reported that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police would soon be making an arrest, for those responsible were among the Sikh community in Vancouver. Today, Indian newspapers at home and abroad regularly carry accounts of violence committed by or toward Sikhs. A recent episode reported in *Time Magazine* described the stopping of a bus by Sikhs and killing 15 people with Hindus retaliating in Delhi.

The unique thing about the violence reported is that it concerns two ethnic communities that have been very close and cooperative until four years ago. The Sikhs have been the backbone of the Indian Army, a vital element in the green revolution and took a prominent part in India's independence movement. The Punjab, the Sikh's home state, is the bread basket of India and Sikhs have excelled in business and industry. Sikhs have always been considered so close to the Hindus that many Hindu families raised their eldest son to be a Sikh.

The situation in India is also important internationally because India commands a position in the Indian Ocean where shipping lanes converge. Also, economic ties between India and the West are increasing as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi continues to lower trade barriers and open India to international trade. India is the world's most populous democracy and has been a shining example of how a democratic

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form of government can work in the developing world. The future social stability of India will influence the perceptions of how viable a democracy is for the Third World.

Much of the disturbance taking place in the northwestern state of Punjab will eventually affect the country's security because Punjab is a border state with Pakistan, is crucial for the country's defense, is the nation's bread basket and is a key communications centre for the road networks are essential for national defense against Pakistan and China. In other words, Punjab is the military, communications and economic heartland of India.³

If it was just the state of Punjab that was involved, the dilemma would be half as bad; but the current circumstances affect the Sikhs, a community which comprises only 18 million⁴ or 1.89% of the population, less than the number of Christians. However, they number 150,000⁵ in the Indian Army holding 12% of the total army and 22% of the officer core (the exact number is classified). In other words, they are the backbone of India's armed forces; and are well known for their innovative farming, technical ability and sports. What happens to the Sikhs will have economic and social repercussions for the country. Other ethnic communities will act according to how they perceive the Centre, treating the Sikh minority as an indicator concerning their prospects for the future. Besides, the Sikhs are an international people with communities in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, Kenya, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand.⁶ The emigrants are using their financial assets and political acumen to influence the situation of their brethren in India⁷—a factor the Prime Minister is countering by urging Britain,⁸ Canada⁹ and the United States to prosecute Sikh revolutionaries.

To understand the problem and develop a solution, three factors have to be analyzed: the political context in which discord arose, the history and perceptions of the Sikh People, and, the influence emigrants have on India's domestic scene.

The Political Context

India is a democracy. A democracy has at least one inherent disadvantage—majority rules. Because minorities are weak, they fear losing their identity and being absorbed by the majority. In India, many groups, including the Sikhs, fear that they will eventually be part of the Hindu fold because India has a history of assimilating communities into the caste system.

Loss of identity has been a major issue for the Sikhs. They sided with the Hindus during independence on Nehru's assurance that they would be able to maintain a Sikh state within the confines of India. Then as well as now, they believed that a Sikh homeland was crucial for their survival; however, a Sikh homeland did not mean it had to be independent of India. 10

On the other hand, the past few years in India have witnessed a wave of Hindu revivalism which has resulted in a backlash against minorities because of the pre-

ferred treatment Muslims and other smaller groups received. Quota systems and other programs have raised the resentment of those who feel that they are placed at a disadvantage because of their being part of the majority. Whether a community rises on its own merits or due to privileged position they are likely to be perceived by the disgruntled element as obtaining their resources due to favored treatment. Since Punjab is the most prosperous Indian state, the Sikhs are the backbone of the armed forces, and sardars, Sikhs, hold substantial positions in governmental services, resentment by some of the less fortunate of the majority community arises—a factor that some politicians exploit to gain power.

If the situation in India was just an issue of a minority attempting to survive a backlash it would be much simpler; unfortunately, it is not. In the last decade, Mrs. Gandhi placed staying in power above national unity. She started by grooming her youngest son Sanjay for leadership. Sanjay's influence was strong and his politics Machiavellian. By the late 1970s, his actions were being felt in a sphere which included Punjab. How did this develop?

Since elections in 1971, a new phenomenon known as "wave politics" has developed in Indian political life. This phenomenon is where political parties rely on slogans, make-shift arrangements and political stunts, rather than cultivating and consolidating a social and economic base of support. In 1971 the slogan was "garibi hatao" (eliminate poverty); in 1977 it was a referendum against the Emergency (a declaration by Mrs. Gandhi giving her autocratic powers); in 1980 it was against the judgment made earlier (the Janata party that had deposed her was so inept that Mrs. Gandhi was returned to office by the voters), and in 1984 it was "unity and integrity of the country." As happened in India, the image of candidates took on greater importance; thus, film stars with no political expertise, like Amitab Butchen, were elected to prominent political offices.¹² This type of politics produced large majorities without the people in power having a stable constituency. Also, slogans created expectations that could not be achieved. Mrs. Gandhi came into power in 1980 with the slogan "elect a government that works." When it did not meet up to people's expectations, support collapsed because there was not a stable constituency and people were disillusioned.13

By 1983 the situation was at a crisis point for Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress(I) Party. They lost the two southern states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in elections. This shocked Congress(I) leadership because the South had been a solid bastion of support. As a result, they developed a strategy to insure success in an election that was three years away. One tactic that had always gained support in the past was a variation of "save the country"; but, who was it to be saved from? In the past Mrs. Gandhi had referred to the "dangers from outside," often insinuating that Pakistan, China or the American CIA were trying to destabilize India. This created the desired fear psychosis needed to gain support. Such a strategy had potential diplomatic problems. Consequently, Mrs. Gandhi played the communal option and she adopted and skillfully used the traditional British divide-and-rule tactic. When

she started to lose the south to phenomenons like Telugu Desam (demands for the greater autonomy of Telugu speakers), her only choice was to capture the Hindu heartland.

The situation of Punjab was tailored for her needs. Lawlessness was rising under the leadership of the young Sikh revolutionary Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. He had been helped into prominence by the Congress (1) Party. After losing the 1977 election, Congress (I) leaders Giani Zail Singh and S. Darbara Singh, with the support of Sanjay Gandhi, decided to help the "Sikh Sant" challenge the leadership of the Akali Dal, the political party of the Punjabi Sikhs. Bhindranwale, head of the Sikh seminary Damdami Taksal, was chosen in spite of his open fundamentalism and belief in violent actions. Congress (I) leadership supported him in the 1979 Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee (SGPC), the administrative body of the Sikh Gurdwaras, elections against the Akali Dal candidate, He was defeated. In 1980, during the Lok Sabha election, however, Bhindranwale shared the dais, or platform, in Gurdaspur with Mrs. Gandhi and later was publicly commended by Rajiv Gandhi. For the next three years, with the help of Congress (I), he mounted a challenge to Akali leadership. The government did not prosecute him in the murders of Lala Jagat Narain and Nirankari14 leader Gurbachan Singh where there was strong reason to believe he and his followers were the culprits. As a result, the image of Bhindranwale being the champion of Sikh grievances was created and enhanced while the Alkalis were perceived as being ineffective since they were continually being rebuffed in New Delhi.

The lawlessness in Punjab provided Mrs. Gandhi with the opportunity to depict the Sikhs as undermining the unity and integrity of the country. The issue of "external" threats to the unity and integrity of country were first tried in the Delhi elections in early 1983 with great success and later in the Jammu and Kashmir referendums. It worked so well that she and Congress (I) leadership never looked backed but began developing and exploiting the new strategy.

Killings and terrorism in Punjab became so rampant that even President's Rule in October 1983 did not stabilize the region. Mrs. Gandhi wanted the turbulence to continue so she could buy time to make her move close to the general elections; yet, she could not allow a total social breakdown to develop in Punjab either. Meanwhile, Bhindranwale's considered himself invincible and shunned Akali leaders who warned that he was playing into the hands of Congress (I).

A turning point was the murder of the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Punjab, A.S. Atwal, on the threshold of the Golden Temple on April 25, 1983. If the government would have taken decisive action at that time, history might have been different; but it did not. As a result, terrorism escalated, and Akali leadership would not stop it. Bhindranwale was an invincible sant in the minds of his followers and many people of rural Punjab.¹⁵

One of the reasons for inept action was stated by one retired government official who said, "The Sikhs and Punjabis have a different psychological orientation; yet the governors of Punjab were neither Sikh nor Punjab and they averaged being in the post for only half a year. As a result, none knew how to handle the situation." All groups have their peculiar nature and the Punjabis and Sikhs are no exception. To effectively deal with such a people a leader has to understand his constituents. This was not the case in Punjab. For the Akalis, they did not have the support of the entire Sikh community. As a result, their strategy had focused on capturing Sikh support. Thus, condemning a saint would have harmed their political goals—a move they were unwilling to take.

During this time, accounts in the press described events as a "Sikh Problem." Reporters refused to acknowledge the diversity within the Sikh community; the various caste groups incorporated, urban versus rural and those inside versus those outside Punjab. The small number of people supporting terrorism were Sikhs and the "Sikhs" were reported as threatening national unity and integrity. In actuality, the Sikhs were not united. A third of their population was living outside Punjab and did not support the Bhindranwale element; they had too much to lose if anti-Sikh sentiment developed. Also the upper economic and industrial strata within Punjab favoured peace and stability over violence and lawlessness. My personal experience in Punjab's Sikh villages revealed Congress (I) having a lot of support among the rural Sikhs. Even the overseas Sikh community in the United States, Britain and Canada was not united on issues concerning Punjab, although a great deal of financial support was donated by expatriates to Bhindranwale and his followers. In the content of the problem.

Wider public opinion, influenced by the government and media, questioned Sikh loyalty to India. Sikh support of the British during the Mutiny of 1857 surfaced while the sacrifices they made during the independence movement went unnoticed. Their proud and valiant social position was being recast to one of shame and disloyalty.

On June 5, 1984, *India Today* reported that the biggest and most significant counter-terrorist action undertaken anywhere in the world was underway—"Operation Bluestar." Among other things, it ended the 400-year continuous recital of the *gurbani* or prayers in the Golden Temple. "Operation Bluestar" was the code name for the full-scale military operation of 70,000 troops in full battle equipage to handle about 500 revolutionaries headed by a young leader who had become a Sant. Units of the Army, Navy, Air Force and para-military troops attacked the Golden Temple and 40 other Sikh shrines. It was conducted at a time when numerous pilgrims were in the Golden Temple and the loss of life was around 1,200 (exact figures are still debated) with many being innocent women and children; also, the revolutionaries, including their leader Bhindranwale, were shot. The Sikh's holiest shrine, the *Akal Takht*, was desecrated and many of the Sikh historical treasures, including holy papers signed by their Gurus' hands, were burned.¹⁹

The result was as Mrs. Gandhi had planned, her popularity exploded—the Hindu heartland was consolidated. It is debatable whether the Hindus are an ethnic community. Professor Robert Frykenberg²⁰ argues that the numerous caste and religious differentiations within the rubric of "Hindu" counter any classification scheme to consider them as a unit. However, Mrs. Gandhi had unified this conglomeration against a small community of less than 2% of the population—the "Hindu" majority against the Sikh minority.

Mrs. Gandhi paid for the victory with her life. On October 31, 1984 she was gunned down by two of her Sikh bodyguards. It was an act that shocked India and the world. The deed was particularly repulsive to the wider Indian population because it was not only done by a trusted bodyguard but against a woman. Such an act being committed by a trusted soldier was seen as an unconscionable betrayal by most. Committing such an act towards a woman was worse. During the time of Mrs. Gandhi's Emergency, talk of her being assassinated was always dismissed in general conversation because "no Indian would do such a thing to a woman." Thus, when she was shot, public reaction was swift with contempt being intense towards the perpetrators. The massacring of Sikhs that followed showed that she had welded the Hindu disparity into a unit of hatred toward a small minority. Although riots took place throughout India, the primary locus was in the poorer Sikh sections of Delhi where almost 3,000 Sikhs lost their lives and others viciously tortured. Some were doused with flammable liquid and burned alive while others were hanged in spread-eagle fashion with a burning tire around their neck. The victim cringed with pain as first his beard and finally the rest of his body was slowly consumed in flames. The viciousness displayed against Sikhs in India's capital city showed an underlying hatred and animosity reminiscent of the days when Sikh blood flowed like rivers in the Punjab under Mughal persecution and Muslim-Hindu slaughtering during the partition of India in 1947. The result was that Indira Gandhi's dream was fulfilled at the price of her life and the unity of the country-the Nehru dynasty was maintained; her son Rajiv was elected to succeed her.

Rajiv Gandhi, the new Prime Minister, immediately set on a course of reconciliation. He reached an accord with Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the President of the Sikh Shiromani Akali Dal, which was in essence a list of demands that the Akali Dal had made back in 1973 in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.²² Rajiv Gandhi received the praise of such Sikh leaders as Khushwant Singh who lauded him for his desire to consult opposition leaders to obtain peace and unity in the country. Rajiv seemed to have the conciliatory manner and sensitivity to public needs that his mother and grandfather had practiced in their earlier years. Bloodshed in the Punjab diminished and the Akali Dal party was elected to govern the state. The unfortunate element was that Longowal was assassinated for his work in bringing peace.

The euphoria ended and violence again rose in Punjab as the accord was not kept and investigations did not result in convictions. Soon after taking office, Julio Francis Ribeiro was given the leadership of Punjab's police and was initially very effective in neutralizing terrorist activity. They killed 36 of India's most wanted terrorists and arrested hundreds of other suspects. Optimistic claims predicted of the revolutionaries being neutralized in the near future. However, things did not work out as predicted. Under the present regime, between 500 and 700 terrorist killings have taken place. On October 3, 1986 six would-be assassins, four of them police, made an attempt on Ribeiro's life as they penetrated a seemingly impregnable compound of the Punjab Armed Police headquarters. Now he and the chief minister live a fortified and sandbagged existence, venturing out only in bullet-proof vehicles guarded by jeeps equipped with machine-guns. Their lives and effectiveness virtually crippled. As the chief minister of Punjab, Surjit Singh Barnala stated, "terrorists are now able to choose the place, time, method and victim at their calling."²⁴

The Mishra Commission appointed by the government has held proceedings in secret but reports indicate that witnesses have been threatened and intimidated. On 15 May 1986 the government amended a section of the 1952 Commission of Inquiry Act to free commissions from the obligation of presenting their findings to Parliament within six months of submittal. The result would be that commission reports on the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and subsequent riots may not be available to the public. The report has been completed and although it is not available to the public, findings have leaked to the press that neither the Congress Party nor the Prime Minister are in anyway linked to the violence.

Thousands have lost their lives and there have been no prosecutions. There has been no effort to heal the wounds caused by slaughter and deceit. A country that once took pride in its unity with diversity has been replaced with social strife. Communities that used to regard themselves as close kins now regard each other with intense animosity. The goal of the Congress (I) leadership has been realized but at the expense of national unity. A small but vital element of the population is alienated and the crucial economic and military heartland of India is in social turmoil.

Sikh Perceptions

Sikh attitudes are an important factor for people act on interpretations and not facts. The Sikhs consider themselves a modern religion because their origins are recent. Their founder, Guru Nanak (1469-1539) preached peace and the commonality between Hindu and Muslim. Nine successors followed. The fifth, Guru Arjun Dev, made a collection of Hindu and Muslim writings and compiled them into the Sikh scriptures, the *Granth* (the book). He installed it in a temple he built in Amritsar, a city founded by his father. Arjun Dev's following grew with a large number being Jats who to this day love the land, emphasize individualism, find dignity in labour and are physically strong, pragmatic, adventurous, straithtforward, outspoken, dynamic and strong.

Arjun Dev's execution under Jahangir began a history of Sikh persecution. Arjun Dev's son organized the followers into an army, but the final transformation came with the tenth and last Guru, Gobind Singh, whose father Tegh Behadur had been beheaded by the Mogul Emperor in Delhi.

Gobind Singh succeeded to the Guruship at the tender age of nine with the mission to "uphold right in every place and destroy sin and evil; that right may triumph, the good may live and tyranny be uprooted from the land." But to get a pacifist people to take up arms required moral justification which Gobind Singh did in preaching, "When all other means have failed, it is righteous to draw the sword." 26

On April 13, 1699, he assembled his believers at Anandpur and initiated five of different Hindu castes into a fighting fraternity called the *Khalsa* (the pure). Their symbols, the Five Ks,²⁷ represented righteous militancy, purity and equality.²⁸ He laid the foundation for a soldier-saint brotherhood that was to last to the present day. As Khushwant Singh put it, "Nanak had propagated goodness, Gobind Singh condemned evil." Thus, military fervour among the Sikhs has traditionally been to right wrongs, serve and survive.

Sikh history in the Punjab is one of bloodshed, martyrdom and revenge. Sikh horsemen continually sparred with Delhi rulers but mobility and guerilla tactics enabled them to evade conquest that had come to their sedentary counterparts. Under the leadership of Maharajah Ranjit Singh (1780-1839), the glorious period of Sikh history developed, the Sikh kingdom of Punjab was created. He was a masterful statesman who modernized the army, expanded territory, defeated erstwhile Afghan and Pathan conquerors and rebuilt the temple in Amritsar. His death brought about the demise of the Sikh kingdom, for without honourable leadership the fighters of the Punjab was annexed by the British in 1849.

The British recognized the martial qualities of the Sikhs and recruited them en masse into their army. The Sikhs sided with the British in the Mutiny of 1857 and were handsomely rewarded with land grants. They became the backbone of the army, and grew into the richest landowning peasantry of India. They were used as soldiers and policemen throughout the British Empire. Their experiences abroad caused them to change loyalties. Consistent indignities administered by whites in Canada and the United States without the British government coming to their support, embittered these lions of the Punjab and they were drawn into the freedom movement and formed the Akali Dal (army of God) party.³⁹

Even during the time of relative favoured treatment, the Sikhs, like the Hindus, reacted to the threat of Christian conversion and feared Hindu absorption. To counter both threats the Singh Sabha movement (1873-1920) was born. Led by Thakur Singh Sandhanwalia, reunification was instilled into a community that was losing its distinctive identity, and if it had not been for the efforts of Sandhanwalia and his followers, Sikhism might have been absorbed into the Hindu fold as one of its numerous sects. Sandhanwalia persuaded Duleep Singh, son of Maharajah Ranjit

Singh, to reconvert from Christianity to his father's religion. They also established the Khalsa College in Amritsar in 1892 and successfully worked to have their community educated. Unlike Bhindranwale of recent times who sought goals by revolution, the members of the Singh Sabha were moderates who believed in constitutional methods, eschewed violence and avoided clashes with the government. It was democratic, non-sectarian and ebbed with the new English-educated middle class among the Sikhs.³⁰

During the freedom movement, the Sikhs were proportionately much more imprisoned, hanged and shot than any other Indian community. They also made up the bulk of the "Indian National Army" which, under the leadership of Subhash Chandra Bose, sided with the opposing powers in the Second World War.

After World War II, the Sikhs were caught between the Indian claims for independence and Muslim demands for Pakistan. The Sikhs consistently opposed Pakistan. The riots of India's partition left the Sikhs paying a terrible price. Outnumbered ten to one by the Muslims, many were slaughtered and their homeland was divided with many Sikh shrines going to Pakistan. Losing their lands in West Punjab, they left Pakistan for India and thus were reduced from the richest landowners in India to a people of poverty. In turn, they drove out Muslim peasants living in East Punjab.

As a result they started emigrating not only to different parts of India but also abroad to join relatives in Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, East Africa, England, Canada and the United States. Over 30 per cent of the 18 million community live outside Punjab, with the largest group being in Delhi; and, almost 10 per cent reside outside India, primarily in the United States, Canada and England.³¹

Sikh separatism had started with the Gurus creating Sikh temples and scriptures. But, as long as there was Muslim domination, they remained united with the Hindus. Under the British, separatism was enhanced as the English nurtured divisive sentiments by giving them separate representation and privileges.

With the independence of India, separate recognition was taken away and Sikh youngsters began questioning their elders, cut their hair and shaved their beards. It was feared by Sikh leaders that in a few decades they would be Hindus believing in Sikhism unless they had a separate Sikh homeland. This fear was enhanced by the fact that the Sikhs were never recognized as a separate community in the Indian constitution—they were regarded as part of the Hindus. Thus, the two Sikh representatives never affixed their names to the document. Some argue today that if Mrs. Gandhi had given them the constitutional recognition as a minority that they desired and as some of her advisors urged her to do, the present problem may have abated. As things developed, however, the Sikhs felt they could settle for nothing less than their homeland if they were to survive. In 1966, the government conceded to the Sikh demand for *Punjabi Suba* a state where the Sikhs had a majority (55%) and their own government with the chief ministers being Sikhs, but not necessarily Akali.

The revival of religious fundamentalism in the Islamic world brought on a reaction by the Hindus in India. Arab Sheiks poured money into India and some in the South converted to the Middle Eastern faith. Hindus countered this threat with resurgence movements of their own. The Sikhs reacted to the Hindu resurgence and began emphasizing Sikh-Hindu differences. First there were hymn singers and preachers going to villages to rekindle the spirit of Guru Gobind Singh. But Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his following, called *Dal Khalsa* (Khalsa Army), became the leaders of those espousing Sikh resurgence.

In 1969, Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, once Finance Minister of the Punjab government living in self-imposed exile in London, declared the Sovereign Republic of Khalistan to make India's Punjab a sovereign Sikh state. The action was considered a joke, but won support among the emigrants in Canada, England and the United States who have kept the idea alive.³²

In April 1973 the Akali Dal, meeting in Anandpur, passed a resolution that many interpreted as leading to the creation of Khalistan. They demanded the exclusive possession of Chandigarh, the capital city built for Punjab but shared by Punjab and Haryana, boundary adjustments to incorporate Punjabi speaking areas that were given to neighboring states, and Punjab having a larger share of the river waters that passed along their territories. A major fear during this time was that the Sikhs were losing their majority in the Punjab. It was perceived that the Sikhs comprised 50% or less of Punjab's population. Government figures for 1986 indicate them to be 65% or more. However, it was the perception of losing their majority and ultimate survival that contributed to militant support.³³

Events since 1980 have caused Sikh leaders to despair. They feel they have been manipulated and insulted by the Central Government. Negotiations failed at least three times because of the Centre's unwillingness to uphold the agreement of the negotiators. On November 3, 1982, agreement was reached, and read over the phone to the Sikh leaders in Amritsar and agreed to; but the printed text released the next day differed from the one read on the phone and so Akalis announced their plans to agitate during the Asian Games (ASIAD) that were scheduled to be held in Delhi. On November 18, 1982 agreement was again reached but Akali representatives were told that "there was some hitch." On April 20, 1983 agreement was reached anew, but the government backed down. One area of contention was the Punjab-speaking Hindu districts of Fazilka-Abohar, Mrs. Gandhi felt these districts should go to Harvana if Punjab gets Chandigarh in spite of the fact that they bordered Pakistan and were not contiguous with Haryana's territory. This would result in a narrow strip of land bifurcating the State of Punjab. The Akali negotiators argued that such an arrangement was not geographically suitable, but Chandigarh was built for the state of Punjab and it should go there. Also, such an agreement would support the idea of Khalistan, which they did not support. "All other states have been divided on a linguistic basis," they argued, "why should Punjab be any different?" Division in India has traditionally been on the basis of language, not religion. To change the rules now would promote the idea of Sikh separatism which was not the intent of the Akali leadership.³⁴

The Sikhs, as a community, were subject to the humiliation of search during the 1982 ASIAD. This the government did because the Akalis, under Longowal's leadership, had threatened to launch a morcha (sit-in) concerning their demands. Many Sikhs thought this unfair. The Sikh community in its entirety was not supporting Akali demands and felt insulted to be subjected to such indignities because of the political aims of one faction. Those living outside of Punjab were moderates in middle class and professional positions who did not agree with Akali goals. Even within Punjab, the Akalis have not been able, until the last election, to capture the entire Sikh vote. Almost 20% or more voted for Congress (I) or other parties. The Akalis in the past have been able to rule only through coalition governments.

In "Operation Blue Star" in June 1984 the Indian army stormed the Golden temple and raised old fears of Sikhs being persecuted by Delhi as the Muslim rulers of old had done. Thus antagonism against the Central government surfaced. Before the time no Sikhs, except Bhindranwale's group and emigrants, talked of Khalistan. Most wanted a Sikh state within India with sufficient controls to insure Sikh survival; but secession from India had not been a serious consideration. The assault on the holiest of Sikh shrines was too great a violation, even for many moderate Sikhs' for it was not only attacked but attacked in an excessively vicious manner.

The same thing could have been done by cordoning off the area and stopping supplies from flowing to the militants. As it happened, hundreds of innocent pilgrims present for the 378th anniversary of the martyrdom of Guru Arjun Dev, the builder of that temple, were killed, some of whom had their hands tied behind them and shot. The Sikh library and musseum were set on fire and nearly 1,000 manuscript copies of the Granth Sahib and numerous *Hukamknamahs* (sacred dictums), many bearing Gurus' signatures, were set to flame. Much of the vandalism was done after all resistance had been overcome.³⁷

Insult was added when the government gave the rebuilding of the Akal Takht to a renegade Sikh sect, Buddha Dal, rather than the SGPC, the legitimate administrative body governing the gurdwaras.³⁶

Many claim that the riots that followed Mrs. Gandhi's assassination were planned and led by Congress Party leaders and Members of Parliament. Word in Delhi indicated that when Rajiv Gandhi heard of his mother's assassination he said, "Let's get those bastards"; and it was with his blessings that the violence was organized and went unabated. As a retired official stated, "Rajiv's public relations people have been selling his "Mr. Clean" image; but his hands were muddied from the start." Witnesses testified that steel rods were systematically supplied to rioters and outsiders were bussed into Delhi to commit the atrocities. In some cases, police persuaded Sikhs to lay down their arms and then would not protect them from the mobs.

It was a systematic assault on the men. The pattern was the same all over Delhi. A Sikh man would be identified, killed or knocked unconscious, then doused with an inflammable liquid and burned. The goal was to insure that the male line would not continue. It reminded one of Mughal rule when horsemen lopped off the heads of every Sikh they saw, as they were easily identified by their uncut hair. These assertions and many more are supported by the citizen's inquiry which later grew into the Citizens Justice Commission, whose membership included such notables as V.M. Tarkunde, retired judge of the Bombay High Court, Chief Justice S.M. Sikri, Lt. Gen. J.S. Aurora and journalist Khushwant Singh. Although it was the poorer sections of Delhi that were hit worst, no one was immune. The once proud Sikhs became an object of torment and shame by the wider society.³⁹

The economy of the Punjab was another factor. When the economic problems were put to Indira Gandhi, they were seldom received with sympathy or support. She asserted that Punjab was "an advanced and comparatively prosperous state" and statistics seemed to support her. Punjab had the second highest produce per acre of wheat and rice of any place in the world and five times the Indian average. It had the highest per capita rural income of India, provided 73% of India's wheat and 48% of its rice. Punjab paid the highest agricultural labour wages in the country and had the highest number of banking offices per 100,000. Much of this success, however, was due to the infusion of emigrant capital with the result of an "external economy" developing, that is, an economy dependent on outside capital giving the illusion of prosperity that did not have a solid economic base. Thus, a plantation economy developed. Landless agricultural laborers have risen from 17% in 1961 to 38.26% in 1981. As land in production increases, jobs did not proportionately increase and wealth became concentrated in the hands of a few. Ten percent of the rural households now own 76% of the agricultural wealth. Small farmers were being displaced and many in this category supported Bhindranwale and his dissident group. Immigrants from other states were being hired at cheaper wages than local workers, and since the Central government would not grant permits for industry to develop a large urban unemployed cadre developed. Also, without the industry the money in Punjab was invested outside the state or being spent on conspicious consumption.⁴

Without the permits to industrialize and decrease unemployment and underemployment, the terrorist activity could not be dealt with; for a large well-educated element of the population became dissatisfied. Related to the above, emigration has been a traditional means of dealing with the economic situation in Punjab. As the doors to the Middle East, Britain, Canada and the United States closed, this safety valve has been plugged. The other release was the army. Sikh representation in the military has been drastically cut from 11 per cent to 3 per cent and the Sikhs want recruitment to be on merit rather than on communal membership.⁴¹

On July 24, 1985 an accord was reached between Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal Party and Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister

of India. It comprised eleven major points: compensation was to be awarded to Sikhs for damage incurred as a result of the Delhi riots; qualifications not communal membership would be the means of selection for army personnel; an inquiry into the November Delhi riots by a government commission would take place; rehabilitation for those Sikhs discharged from the army (a number deserted during the time period of Operation Bluestar and the Delhi riots) would be instituted; an All Indian Gurdwara Act (at present the SGPC, Sikh administrative body, does not have control of their Gurdwaras outside Punjab) would be instituted to give the SGPC national administration of Sikh places of worship; pending cases concerning airline hijackings and other crimes would be disposed of quickly (secret trials of Sikhs are taking place as others are just being held); Chandigarh would go to Punjab and territorial claims would be settled by a commission; water claims would be settled by a tribunal; minority interests would be represented; and the Punjabi language would be promoted. The parties agreed that the accord was within the framework of the India constitution.⁴²

Dissenters did not approve of the accord for three reasons: they wanted army deserters to be exonerated not rehabilitated, they felt the government should apologize for Operation Bluestar, they argued that all cases should be dropped against Sikh terrorists and hijackers, and Sikh prisoners should immediately be released.⁴³

Elections were called without Longowal having sufficient time to consolidate his position. But it did not matter; he was felled by an assassin's bullet on August 20, not quite a month after the accord was signed. The man of peace was sacrificed for the cause of communal harmony, a goal that the founder of his religion also shared. All was not lost, however. The mantle was taken and carried to completion by Surjit Singh Barnala; under his leadership moderates won the elections and acquired power in Punjab.

Violence was abating, but when dissident Sikhs saw that the accord was not being kept by the central government social unrest began to rise. To date, not one tenet of the accord has been adhered to by the Centre. Chandigarh has not been transferred to Punjab by January 26, 1986, as per agreement; the Mishra Commission has been moving excessively slow; and their methods and intentions have been questioned. The Citizens Justice Commission has withdrawn from working with them because witnesses were subject to threats and intimidation; and actions were taken in such secrecy that no independent evaluation was possible. Even the terms of reference concerning the commission's charge were biased against the victims. Worst of all, perpetuators in the riots have not been prosecuted.⁴⁴

Such a situation is weakening the position of the Akali moderates and causing the militants, lead by Bhindranwale's father and other members of the *Dal Khalsa*, to gain support. On April 30, 1986 Barnala, in consultation with Rajiv Gandhi but not all his cabinet ministers, had the militant faction ousted from the Golden Temple as they had again taken over the premises for three months. This time it

was a police action, not an army operation, and it was ordered by the head of the Akali Party, in consultation with the Prime Minister. But, three cabinet ministers and 27 legislators abandoned Barnala;⁴⁵ and he was ordered to do penance by the temple priests (the very people he had helped) and shined the shoes of pilgrims at the Golden Temple for a week.⁴⁶

The situation from the Sikhs' perspective is grave. A minority community has been victimized for the sake of people wanting to have power. They have been relegated from a position of pride to one of contempt. What the future holds for the Sikhs is unknown; but from their perspective nothing has been done to indicate that any restitution is being made, so they question whether India is their homeland. In June of this year the Central government announced that Chandigarh would be transferred to Punjab on June 21, 1986.⁴⁷ This promise was again broken; in fact, a new commission may be set up (the Punjab cabinet refused to recognize the previous one headed by Justice D.A. Desai). 48 At the time of this writing, nothing has been done to alleviate Sikh demands. The Barnala government is perceived as having no clout with the Centre. 49 As a result, the militants are becoming stronger. The Khalistan flag was raised in Amritsar and the National flag was burned as thousands of Sikhs shouted Khalistan and Bhindranwale Zindabad slogans. 50 Also, the SGPC has released two moderate Head Priests and placed a third on indefinite leave. As moderates in power are shown to be ineffective, the revolutionaries are gradually gaining more and more power. There are moderate voices in the Sikh community. Right after the Accord, they were gaining strength in both Punjab and India in general. The economic interest of urbanized Sikhs in Punjab and all outside of the state would gain nothing from Sikh secession. And if an anti-Sikh sentiment galvanizes, they have much to lose and nothing to gain. Many prominent Sikhs such a as General Aurora, who commanded the Indian Army during the Bangladesh War, and journalist and writer Khushwant Singh are doing their best to bring about reconciliation. Khalistan, however, is an emotional issue, but since the moderate element is not supported by the Central Government, they are perceived as ineffective and so the more militant element is gradually gaining power in the Sikh organization.

Emigrant Factor

The third consideration in this scenario is the emigrant factor, that is, the influence of India's expatriates on the country's domestic affairs. If one looks at the history of the Indian and Sikh emigrant communities, they are replete with involvement in India's internal politics. At the turn of the century, newspapers like *Free Hindustan* were being published in America. The most notable revolutionary movement was lead by the Ghadr (meaning revolutionary or mutiny) Party in the United States, their headquarters were in San Francisco. Under the leadership of Lala Har Dayal they planned to start a revolution to gain Punjab's independence from the

British. In 1913 they started a newspaper with the goal of promoting revolution in Punjab.

Due to British pressure, many leaders were arrested for violating America's Neutrality Laws. During this "Hindoo Conspiracy Trial" a witness was shot to death in the courtroom. However, Ghadr activities continued until 1947 when India obtained independence.⁵¹

History has repeated itself with Gurpartap Singh Birk recently being tried and convicted in the United States for violating America's neutrality laws. 52 Like those of the Ghadr Conspiracy, he was found guilty of conspiring to buy explosives and mount a military action against the government of India. Some emigrants continue to promote revolution as in the past, Gurdwaras in the United States and England give thousands of dollars a week to the revolutionary movement in Punjab;53 and Manbir Singh Chanderu, chief of the "Khalistan Commando Force," confessed that he had received more than \$60,000 from Canada.54 When Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated it was the Sikhs in the United States, not India, who were shown on television rejoicing and drinking champagne. What is it about the emigrant community that prompted Khushwant Singh and others to condemn the way they have contributed to social unrest in Punjab and India, or prompted writers like Pran Chopra 55 to refer to them as "fools, knaves and buffoons." Like in India, the community is not unified. The revolutionary element, led by members of the World Sikh Organization in the United States, rejected the Gandhi-Longowal accord while moderates in India supported it. 4 Yet, it is the extreme elements that obtain publicity.

Indian emigrants look to their homeland for meaning, for it is in their community of origin where they gain prestige and acknowledgement. In the United States they may be outstanding, but when they walk down the street no one knows them. In India each expatriate feels important with resources and influence from America. Many emigrate with the dream of being a Member of Parliament when they return to India. They send money home to their community and start hospitals, schools and welfare projects, 57 although supporting a revolution has become a Sikh priority these last three years.

The present turmoil is a golden opportunity to gain recognition and importance. Since the emigrants have nothing but a little money to lose, they can afford to take an extreme stand since they are not threatened. The emigrant influence is deeply felt in India's local politics, economy, and social affairs. They pressure their governments of residence to be sympathetic to the cause they espouse. Their influence in Indian is strong because they use their financial resources. Presently they filter arms and money through Pakistan, which also reasons that if Punjab becomes unstable its goal of acquiring Kashmir will be realized and its eastern border will be more secure. As one Sikh businessman in Delhi said, "The Sikhs abroad gain their recognition but we pay the price."

There is also the guilt factor. Many Indian emigrants in the West feel guilty for their wealth while family and friends in India go without it. Sending money for a revolution or any other cause alleviates the conscience without personal sacrifice on the donor's part. This is especially true as the value of individualism takes hold among the emigrants that in Indian culture is considered selfishness. Monetary contributions are a means to alleviate the conscience.

Next, the press only reports the dramatic, and although accounts are correct they only detail the violence and not the peaceful elements. Thus, emigrants do not know the total picture. To illustrate, Punjab is a restricted area, yet one visitor reported, "I got my visa to go into Punjab but no one ever checked it. All was peaceful. From newspaper reports, I expected to see violence everywhere." The impression he had from the press was very different from what he actually saw. This all contributes to a mass perception abroad that their people are suffering beyond what may actually be the case. This helps create a mass sympathy movement that people may realize intellectually that it is not good, but social pressure forces compliance. This was illustrated by one Sikh in England who put it well when he stated, "I know the militants are not right, and most of the community here know it. But the emotions of the community are such that even though you know better, you do not dare talk about Khalistan." Thus, for the emigrant Sikhs, supporting a revolution even to the detriment of India is practiced.

Conclusions

The three forces, political strategies to remain in power—i.e., divide and rule, Sikh quest for survival⁵⁸ and Sikh emigrants—are working to keep violence in Punjab alive. The Sikh moderate element who wants peace includes most of those Sikhs living in urban Punjab and outside the state. Yet there is the Congress Party that in order to stay in power solidified the Hindu vote by raising the flames of communalism, which once lit are very difficult to extinguish. Rajiv Gandhi is blocked into a strategy where he must hold the Hindu majority if he is to stay in power. Thus, he cannot give in to any Sikh demands especially if it will antagonize the Hindu sentiments. Sikhs have been recent victims of the most vicious atrocities in modern history and question whether they can continue to have their old status in the national society. Murray Leaf⁵⁹ argues that India's constitution is so riddled with exceptions that the Central Government has too much power; thus the party in power can develop communal hatred to remain in office. He and Robin Jeffrey⁶⁰ argued that one thing that could be done would be to guarantee the Sikhs the right to exist in India as a minority.

One of the problems of finding a settlement is that the issues concerning Punjab are argued by the Akali Dal Party and based on the Anandpur Resolution; yet, when they are about to lose territory they argue on linguistic grounds as they did concerning the districts of Fazilka-Abhor. Their goal is to maintain power but to argue ethnicity when the aim is Sikh power is disastrous. The result is reflected by Kuldip Nayar who laments the fact that "there are no Punjabis any more—only Sikhs and Hindus." The religious division that has taken place has virtually

eliminated Punjabis as an ethnic group and divided them according to religion.

Just because a region is prosperous does not mean that it will be socially integrated, a lesson Western-oriented planners seem to continually forget. Punjab is the wealthiest state, yet disparity has resulted in a dissatisfied element whose position may still be far above the lower half of India's population. Yet, they evaluate their situation in relation to those they see around them. And, even if they are on par with others they may not be satisfied. Khushwant Singh emphasizes that "Sikhs enjoyed privileges far beyond those warranted by the proportion of their population and Arun Shourie rightly described the Sikhs as a "pampered community," Many argue that the Sikhs deserved their "privileges"; but other states needed the licenses for industrialization more than Punjab. That does not eliminate the feelings of the dissidents, supported by emigrant money. And the revolutionary Sikhs are helped by another factor, the rapid industrialization and social changes that are taking place in Punjab. When fast social and cultural change takes place, a community often reverts to conservatism. The Islamic revolution in Iran is a very good example. It was a rapidly changing society and many relinquished their "advancements" for the security of the old ways. Although more study needs to be done, the Sikhs in Punjab were in rapidly changing society with the fear of losing their identity. Thus the conservatism of Bhindranwale and his followers was appealing.

The events of the past four years have brought about an insecurity for Sikhs outside of Punjab so that one of the major problems facing the state is the massive immigration of Sikhs into the state. At present, the Indian government continues to rely on police and paramilitary force. They have committed excesses in the name of law and order. This is one reason revolutionaries are sheltered by the Sikhs in Punjab. Also, the policy is to use force rather than seek a political and social solution to the problem. The rest of India is watching the situation in Punjab and all realize that if the police and paramilitary forces can act brutally in Punjab, it can happen to them also.⁶³

Like days of old, revenge is carried out. General Arunkumar Shreedhar Vadiya, who was Chief of the Indian Army at the time of "Operation Bluestar," was assassinated in August of 1986. Recently gunmen shot dead Lieutenant-Colonel Sant Bhuller, who took part in the assault on the Golden Temple, as was Congress (I) leader Joginder Pal Pandey. ⁶⁴ In spite of the forces encouraging social unrest, it is encouraging to note that in Delhi there are many Sikh and Hindu groups who are working hard to reestablish this unity, placing emphasis on ideals rather than expediency. Unfortunately they are not receiving support from the Central Government. One gratifying note is that businesses are still investing in Punjab. As one official in a multi-national corporation said, "We are continuing to put money into Punjab. The violence is localized to the Amritsar and Gudaspur districts; the rest of the state will bring us a good return for our money."

Notes

- 1. It must be kept in mind that although the Sikhs and Punjab capture the news at this time, communal violence is not unique to this group for communalism is rising in India. Linguistic tensions exist in Assam, Goa, Belgaum, and Hindu-Christian tensions in Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. Communal riots have recently cost many lives in Uttar Pradesh. Since the Emergency imposed by Mrs. Gandhi in middle 1975, there have been over 3,000 communal riots in the country. See Suman Dubey and Gobind Thukral, "Punjab: Upsurge of Violence," India Today, 15 April 1986, pp. 10-11; "India: The Trident and the Sword," The Economist, 2-8 Aug. 1986; and "Communalism: A Failure in Leadership," India Today, 1-15 Aug. 1986, p. 21.
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- 4. Wallace, op cit., pp. 364, 365.
- I. K. Gujral, "The Economic Dimension," Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends, Amrik Singh, ed. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1985.)
- Arthur W. Helweg, Sikhs in England: The Development of a Migrant Community, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979, Second Edition 1986), p. 6.
- Ramesh Chandran, "United Kingdom: Tackling Terrorism," India Today, November 1985, pp. 28, 29; Shantanu Ray, "Militant Chief Admits Canada Ties," India Abroad, 5 Sept. 1986, pp. 1, 5.
- Francis Kerry, "Britain Names Official for Deals on Militants," India Abroad, 11 April 1986, pp. 1,8.
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- 10. To an outsider, such fears may seem groundless since Sikhs have been able to maintain their identity in expatriate communities scattered all over the world. Yet the fears remain. See Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Volume 2, 1839-1964 (London and Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 305.
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- 12. This is similar to recent political processes in the United States.
- 13. D.L. Sheth and A.S. Narang, "The Electoral Angle," in *Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends*, Amrik Singh, ed. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1985), pp. 123-134.
- 14. The Nirankaris recognize gurus other than the ten of the Granth Sahib and additional scriptures which most Sikhs, including the Bhindranwale group, reject. Bhindranwale and others considered this offensive to the Gurus and the Granth Sahib.
- 15. Harji Malik, "The Politics of Alienation," In *Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation*, Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds. (New Delhi: Patwant Singh, 1985), pp. 33-62; D.L. Seth and A.S. Narang, op. cit., 1985.
- 16. Patwant Singh, "The Distorting Mirror," Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation, Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds. (New Delhi: Patwant Singh 1985), pp. 9-32; Pritam Singh, "The Role of the Media," Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends, Amrik Singh, ed., (Delhi: Ajanta Publications), pp. 155-184.
- Ramesh Gune, "Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab Rejoice: But Students Are Skeptical" and "Mixed Views in N. America," *India Abroad*, 2 Aug. 1985, pp. 1, 17.
- Patwant Singh, "The Distorting Mirror," Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation, Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds., (New Delhi: Patwant Singh, 1985), pp. 20, 21.

- 19. Shekhar Gupta and Gobind Thukral, "Punjab Breakthrough," *India Today*, 15 Aug. 1985, pp. 6-18; and Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, *Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985).
- 20. Robert Frykenberg, personal communication.
- Madhu Kishwar, "Gangster Rule," Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation, Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds. (New Delhi: Patwant Singh, 1985), pp. 171-190; M. Ghazali, "The Charge is Sedition," Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation, Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds., (New Delhi: Patwant Singh, 1985), pp. 196-202.
- 22. The resolution was developed by Akali leaders to gain support as their political base was rapidly declining. Initially, the document was not taken seriously by many, especially those outside of the Akali party.
- 23. "India: The Trident and the Sword," The Economist, 2 Aug. 1986, pp. 30, 31.
- 24. "Punjab: What Can Be Done?" India Today, 31 Dec. 1986, p. 29.
- Tarun Basu, "Gandhi and Longowal in Pact that Ends Punjab Agitation", India Abroad,
 May 1986a, pp. 1, 18; Tarun Basu, "New Decrees Could Suppress Findings on Indira's Slaying," India Abroad,
 May 1986b, pp. 1, 4.
- 26. Khushwant Singh, "Sikh Power," Across the Board, June 1983, pp. 41-46.
- 27. These included unshorn hair (kesh) to symbolizes strength, have a comb in the hair (kangha) to symbolize saintliness (unkept hair shows madness, neat uncut hair symbolizes saintliness), to wear shorts designed to give freedom of movement (kucha), to wear a steal bracelet on the right wrist because it is vulnerable in sword fighting (kara) and to symbolize poverty. They also drank amrit (nectar) from the same bowl to show equality, and were given the same suffix name "Singh" (lion). They were enjoined to not smoke or chew tobacco, consume alcohol or molest women.
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- 29. Ibid.
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- 32. M.J. Akbar, India: The Siege Within: Challenges to A Nation's Unity, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985) pp. 164-172.
- 33. Khushwant Singh, op. cit., 1966, pp. 289-305; and op. cit., 1983.
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- 35. Harji Malik, op. cit., 1985, p. 38.
- 36. Ibid. p. 39.
- 37. Khushwant Singh, "The Brink of the Abyss," *Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation*, Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds., (New Delhi: Patwant Singh, 1985), pp. 128-132; and Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, op. cit. pp. 155-173.
- 38. Harii Malik, op. cit., 1985, p. 47.
- 39. Madhu Kishwar, op. cit.; M. Ghazali, op. cit.; Vichitra Sharma, "Recalling Those Days." Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends, Amrik Singh, ed. (Delhi: Ajanta Publication, 1985), pp. 219-237; Joseph Maliakan, "The Trilokpuri Carnage," Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues. and Trends, Amrik Singh, ed. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1985, pp. 238-250; Darshan Singh Maini, "O Delhi, Delhi," Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends,

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- 41. Iqbal Singh, op. cit., 1986, pp. 135, 136.
- 42. Tarun Basu, op. cit., 1986a.
- 43. Shekhar Gupta and Gobind Thukral, op. cit., 1985, p. 14.
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- 62. Khushwant Singh's Preface," Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Bluestar & After, Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1984), pp. 9-14.
- 63. Kuldip Nayar, op. cit. 1987, pp. 2, 3.
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